dcg (Destructive Command Guard)

A high-performance hook for AI coding agents that blocks destructive commands before they execute, protecting your work from accidental deletion across Claude Code, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI, Copilot CLI, VS Code Copilot Chat, Cursor, Hermes Agent, Grok (xAI), Posit Assistant, Oh My Pi, and related tools.

Supported: Claude Code, Codex CLI 0.125.0+, Gemini CLI, GitHub Copilot CLI, VS Code Copilot Chat, Cursor IDE, Hermes Agent, Posit Assistant (Positron/RStudio extension, standalone server, and pa terminal client), Grok (xAI) (native ~/.grok/hooks/ plus Claude compatibility layer), Antigravity CLI (agy) (native ~/.gemini/config/hooks.json via dcg install --agy), OpenCode (native tool.execute.before plugin via dcg install --opencode — see docs/opencode-integration.md), Oh My Pi (omp) (native tool_call extension via dcg install --omp), Pi (via extension recipe), Aider (limited—git hooks only), Continue (detection only)

curl -fsSL "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/main/install.sh?$(date +%s)" | bash -s -- --easy-mode

& ([scriptblock]::Create((irm "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/main/install.ps1"))) -EasyMode -Verify

TL;DR

The Problem: AI coding agents (Claude, Codex, Gemini, Copilot, etc.) occasionally run catastrophic commands like git reset --hard, rm -rf ./src, or DROP TABLE users—destroying hours of uncommitted work in seconds.

The Solution: dcg is a high-performance hook that intercepts destructive commands before they execute, blocking them with clear explanations and safer alternatives.

Why Use dcg?

Quick Example

# AI agent tries to run:
$ git reset --hard HEAD~5

# dcg intercepts and blocks:
════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
BLOCKED  dcg
────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Reason:  git reset --hard destroys uncommitted changes

Command: git reset --hard HEAD~5

Tip: Consider using 'git stash' first to save your changes.
════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════

Enable More Protection

# ~/.config/dcg/config.toml
[packs]
enabled = [
    "database.postgresql",    # Blocks DROP TABLE, TRUNCATE
    "kubernetes.kubectl",     # Blocks kubectl delete namespace
    "cloud.aws",              # Blocks aws ec2 terminate-instances
    "containers.docker",      # Blocks docker system prune
]

Agent-Specific Profiles

dcg automatically detects which AI coding agent is invoking it and can apply agent-specific configuration. The trust_level field is an advisory label recorded in JSON output and logs — it does not directly change rule evaluation. Behavioral differences come from the other profile fields:

# Trust Claude Code more — wider allowlist, fewer packs
[agents.claude-code]
trust_level = "high"
additional_allowlist = ["npm run build", "cargo test"]
disabled_packs = ["kubernetes"]

# Oh My Pi has its own canonical profile (distinct from legacy Pi)
[agents.omp]
trust_level = "medium"
extra_packs = ["strict_git"]

# Restrict unknown agents — extra rules, no allowlist bypass
[agents.unknown]
trust_level = "low"
extra_packs = ["strict_git", "database"]  # real pack / category IDs (see `dcg packs`)
disabled_allowlist = true

extra_packs/disabled_packs take the same pack and category IDs as `[packs] e